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Partnership, Accountability, and Innovation: Clarifying Boston's Experience with Focused Deterrence

Anthony A. Braga, Christopher Winship, and Brandon Turchan

Pioneered in Boston as part of its Operation Ceasefire strategy to halt serious youth violence in the 1990s, focused deterrence approaches (also known as "pulling levers" policing) have been embraced by police departments in the United States and other countries as an effective approach to crime prevention (Travis, 1998; Dalton, 2002; Deuchar, 2013). In its simplest form, the approach consists of selecting a particular crime problem, such as youth homicide; convening an interagency working group of law enforcement practitioners; conducting research to identify key offenders, groups, and behavior patterns; framing a response to offenders and groups of offenders that uses a varied menu of sanctions to stop them from continuing their violent behavior; focusing social services and community resources on targeted offenders and groups to match law enforcement prevention efforts; and directly and repeatedly communicating with offenders to make them understand why they are receiving this special attention (Kennedy, 1997; Kennedy, in this volume). Although the goal of focused deterrence strategies is to prevent crime by changing offender perceptions of sanction risk, other complementary crime prevention mechanisms seem to support the crime control efficacy of these programs (Braga and Kennedy, 2012; Kennedy, Kleiman, and Braga, 2017). These strategies are also intended to change offender behavior by mobilizing community action, enhancing procedural justice, and improving police legitimacy.

A growing body of rigorous scientific evidence suggests focused deterrence strategies have been useful in preventing violence beyond the Boston experience (Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan, 2018). A recent review by the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded that focused deterrence strategies generate noteworthy crime control impacts when applied to gang and group-related violence, disorderly street drug markets, and repeat offender problems (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2017). However, Boston has been challenged to sustain the implementation of the Ceasefire strategy over extended time periods (Braga, Hureau, and Winship, 2008). High profile replications of the Boston approach have experienced similar challenges. In Baltimore, local political problems undermined the implementation process (Braga, Kennedy, and Tita, 2002). In Minneapolis, the strategy was abandoned as the participating agencies returned to their traditional methods of dealing with violence (Kennedy and Braga, 1998).

We believe that the difficulties experienced in Boston and by other jurisdictions stem from a limited understanding of the larger Ceasefire story. Boston's success in reducing youth violence has been attributed to a wide variety of programs and strategies: public health interventions, police-probation partnerships, enhanced federal prosecutions, police-black minister partnerships, and the Ceasefire focused deterrence strategy. Many observers have suggested that these are isolated and competing explanations. For example, in his discussion of Operation Ceasefire and the Boston Police Department's collaboration with activist black ministers, Fagan (2002) describes these as "two distinct and contrasting narratives [that] comprise the Boston story" (136).

In reality, the Boston story consists of multiple interconnected layers. As we discuss below, the implementation of Ceasefire was possible because of newly formed

relationships among the police and other law enforcement and social service agencies and between the police and the community, with the latter creating important mechanisms for police accountability. Thus, although available quantitative evidence suggests that Operation Ceasefire was the key initiative associated with a significant reduction in youth violence, a fuller and more nuanced description of the Boston experience is needed. A narrow and inappropriate interpretation of Boston's success as simply being due to Operation Ceasefire creates the danger of unrealistic expectations of success, serious implementation problems in replicating the Ceasefire program, and an inability to sustain implemented violence prevention programs.

In order to understand the innovations that took place in Boston's policing strategies during the 1990s it is necessary to examine the importance of two key elements that created the foundation that made change possible. First, in order for the Boston Police to develop an innovative program involving a variety of partners, it was essential to have established a "network of capacity" consisting of dense and productive relationships that partners could be drawn from. Second, because of the long history of perceived racism by the Boston Police, a new mechanism of police accountability was necessary in order to create trust that new programs would be beneficial to the community. This trust was essential for establishing needed community and political support for innovative efforts by the Boston Police. Operation Ceasefire simply could not have been launched without either a network of partners who were a central component of its design or the trust that derived from accountability.

This chapter begins by briefly describing the key elements of Ceasefire. It then examines the available evidence on Ceasefire's effect on serious violence in Boston and

elsewhere. It subsequently discusses the implementation of Ceasefire within the changing political context of police community relationships and evolving police partnerships with other agencies. It then analyzes the implications of the fuller Boston story for replicating and sustaining the Boston approach in other jurisdictions. Finally, the chapter reviews implementation challenges in applying focused deterrence in other jurisdictions and presents some key strategies for maintaining and ensuring program integrity.

The Boston Gun Project and Operation Ceasefire

Like many American cities during the late 1980s and early 1990s, Boston suffered an epidemic of youth violence that had its roots in the rapid spread of street-level crack-cocaine markets (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996). The Boston Gun Project was a problem-oriented policing project aimed at preventing and controlling serious youth violence. The problem analysis phase of the Project began in early 1995 and the Operation Ceasefire strategy was implemented in mid 1996. The trajectory of the Project and of Ceasefire has been extensively documented (see, e.g. Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996; Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 2001; Kennedy, in this volume). Briefly, a problem-solving working group of law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and researchers diagnosed the youth violence problem in Boston as one of patterned, largely vendetta-like hostility amongst a small population of highly active criminal offenders, and particularly amongst those involved in some 60 loose, informal, mostly neighborhood-based gangs. Based on the problem analysis findings, the Boston Gun Project working group crafted the Operation Ceasefire initiative that was tightly focused on disrupting ongoing conflicts among youth gangs.

The Boston Police Department's Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF), an elite unit of some 40 officers and detectives, coordinated the actions of Operation Ceasefire. An interagency working group, comprised of law enforcement personnel, youth workers, and members of Boston's Ten Point Coalition of activist black clergy, was convened on a bi-weekly basis to address outbreaks of serious gang violence. Operation Ceasefire's "pulling levers" strategy was designed to deter gang violence by reaching out directly to gangs, saying explicitly that violence would no longer be tolerated, and backing up that message by "pulling every lever" legally available when violence occurred (Kennedy, 1997). These law enforcement levers included disrupting street-level drug markets, serving warrants, mounting federal prosecutions, and changing the conditions of community supervision for probationers and parolees in the targeted group. Simultaneously, youth workers, probation and parole officers, and clergy offered gang members services and other kinds of help. If gang members wanted to step away from a violent lifestyle, the Ceasefire working group focused on providing them with the services and opportunities necessary to make the transition.

The Ceasefire Working Group delivered their anti-violence message in formal meetings with gang members; through individual police and probation contacts with gang members; through meetings with inmates of secure juvenile facilities in the city; and through gang outreach workers (Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl, 2001). The deterrence message was not a deal with gang members to stop violence. Rather, it was a promise to gang members that violent behavior would evoke an immediate and intense response. If gangs committed other crimes but refrained from violence, the normal workings of police, prosecutors, and the rest of the criminal justice system dealt with these matters.

But if gang members shot and killed people, the Working Group focused its enforcement actions on the violent gang.

A large reduction in the yearly number of Boston youth homicides (victims ages 24 years or younger) followed immediately after Operation Ceasefire was implemented in mid-1996. This reduction was sustained for the next five years (see Figure 1). The Ceasefire program, as designed, was in place until 2000 (Braga, Hureau, and Winship, 2008). During the early years of new millennium, the Boston Police experimented with a broader approach to violence prevention by expanding certain Ceasefire tactics to a broader range of problems such as serious repeat violent gun offenders, the re-entry of incarcerated violent offenders back into high-risk Boston neighborhoods, and criminogenic families in hot spot areas. These new approaches were known broadly as "Boston Strategy II" and seemed to diffuse the ability of Boston to respond to ongoing conflicts among gangs (Braga, Hureau, and Winship, 2008). Youth homicide, most of which was gang related, returned as a serious problem for the City of Boston in 2004 and this rise continued through 2007.

The Boston Police Department and its partners reinstated the Operation Ceasefire approach in mid-2007 to address this concerning increase in serious youth violence (Braga, Papachristos, and Hureau, 2014). The reconstituted Ceasefire program was highly focused on addressing ongoing violent conflicts among gangs, drew upon the violence prevention principles of the original strategy, and effectively engaged the existing network of criminal justice, social service, and community-based partners in Boston. Once again, youth homicide decreased after the implementation of the Ceasefire focused deterrence regime (Figure 1).

Evidence on the Impact of Ceasefire on Serious Violence

A U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)-sponsored evaluation of Operation Ceasefire implemented during the 1990s used a non-randomized control group design to analyze trends in serious violence between 1991 and 1998. The evaluation reported that the 1990s Ceasefire intervention was associated with a 63% decrease in monthly number of Boston youth homicides, a 32% decrease in monthly number of shots-fired calls, a 25% decrease in monthly number of gun assaults, and, in one high-risk police district given special attention in the evaluation, a 44% decrease in monthly number of youth gun assault incidents (Braga, Kennedy, Waring, and Piehl, 2001). The evaluation also suggested that Boston's significant youth homicide reduction associated with Operation Ceasefire was distinct when compared to youth homicide trends in most major U.S. and New England cities.

Other researchers, however, have observed that the some of the decrease in homicide may have occurred without the Ceasefire intervention in place as violence was decreasing in most major U.S. cities (Fagan, 2002; Levitt, 2004). The National Academies' Panel on Improving Information and Data on Firearms concluded that the Ceasefire evaluation was compelling in associating the intervention with the subsequent decline in youth homicide (Wellford, Pepper, and Petrie, 2005). However, the Panel also suggested that many complex factors affect youth homicide trends and it was difficult to specify the exact relationship between the Ceasefire intervention and subsequent changes in youth offending behaviors. While the DOJ-sponsored evaluation controlled for existing violence trends and certain rival causal factors such as changes in the youth

population, drug markets, and employment in Boston, there could be complex interaction effects among these factors not measured by the evaluation that could account for some meaningful portion of the decrease. The evaluation was not a randomized, controlled experiment. Therefore, the non-randomized control group research design cannot rule out these internal threats to the conclusion that Ceasefire was the key factor in the youth homicide decline.

Like the Panel, we believe that Ceasefire was responsible for a meaningful proportion of the youth homicide decline during the 1990s. However, it is difficult to determine the exact contribution of Ceasefire to the decline. Clearly, other factors were responsible for some of the decline. Braga, Hureau, and Papachristos (2014) conducted a more rigorous quasi-experimental evaluation of the reconstituted Boston Ceasefire program implemented during the mid-2000s. Propensity scores were used to match treated Boston gangs to untreated Boston gangs who were not connected to the treated gangs through rivalries or alliances. Differences-in-differences estimators in growth-curve regression models were used to assess the impact of Ceasefire by comparing gun violence trends for matched treatment gangs relative to matched comparisons gangs during the 2006 through 2010 study time period. The evaluation reported that total shootings involving directly-treated Ceasefire gangs were reduced by 31% relative to total shootings involving comparison gangs. Using similar evaluation methods, Braga, Apel, and Welsh (2013) found that the Ceasefire strategy also created spillover deterrent effects onto other gangs that were socially connected to targeted gangs through rivalries and alliances. Total shootings involving these "vicariously-treated" gangs were also decreased by 24% relative to total shootings by matched comparison gangs.

It is important to note that the findings from the mid-2000s Ceasefire evaluation yielded a much more conservative violence reduction estimate when compared with program impacts reported in the 1990s Ceasefire quasi-experimental evaluation. It is well known among social scientists that program evaluations with more rigorous research designs tend to result in smaller and null effects (Rossi, 1987). Nonetheless, we believe it is problematic to implement programs that falsely raise citizen expectations of large violent crime reductions and dramatic changes in the quality of residential life in neighborhood suffering from persistent drug and violent crime problems. It is much more prudent to take a skeptical approach to policy interventions until a portfolio of proven practices has been developed. The available focused deterrence evaluation evidence suggests that the approach does indeed reduce crime (Weisburd and Majmundar, 2017). Nevertheless, as the quality of program evaluations continue to improve, the impacts of focused deterrence programs seem to be much more modest relative to the large violence reduction and quality-of-life improvements described in earlier accounts (for a discussion, see Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan, 2018).

The Larger Boston Story I: The Development of a "Network of Capacity"

Missing from the account of Operation Ceasefire reported in most law enforcement circles is the larger story of an evolving collaboration that spanned the boundaries that divide criminal justice agencies from one another, criminal justice agencies from human service agencies, and criminal justice agencies from the community. Such collaborations are necessary to legitimize, fund, equip, and operate complex strategies that are most likely to succeed in both controlling and preventing

youth violence (Moore, 2002). The solid working relationships that were at the heart of the interagency working group process were developed long before the Boston Gun Project commenced in 1995. In essence, Boston created a very powerful "network of capacity" to prevent youth violence (Moore, 2002). This network was well positioned to launch an effective response to youth violence because criminal justice agencies, community groups, and social service agencies coordinated and combined their efforts in ways that could magnify their separate effects. Ceasefire capitalized on these existing relationships by focusing the network on the problem of serious gang violence.

Criminal justice agencies work largely independent of each other, often at cross-purposes, often without coordination, and often in an atmosphere of distrust and dislike (Kennedy, 2002). Until the height of the youth violence epidemic, this observation was certainly true in Boston. It was painfully apparent that no one agency could mount a meaningful response to the gang violence that was spiraling out of control in the city. The crisis forced Boston criminal justice agencies to work together and develop new approaches to deal with the violence problem. YVSF officers and detectives and line-level workers from other criminal justice agencies collaborated on a variety of innovative programs, including: "Operation Nightlight"—a police-probation partnership to ensure at-risk youth were abiding by the conditions of their release into the community (Corbett, Fitzgerald, and Jordan, 1998); "Safe Neighborhoods Initiatives"—a community prosecution program that was rooted in a partnership between the Suffolk County District Attorney's Office, the Boston Police, and community members in hot spot neighborhoods (Coles and Kelling, 1999); and a partnership between the Boston Police, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), and the U.S. Attorney's Office to identify and

apprehend illegal gun traffickers who were providing guns to violent gangs (Kennedy, Piehl, and Braga, 1996).

The YVSF also formed working relationships with social service and opportunity provision agencies. For certain prevention initiatives, the YVSF was the lead agency involved in the program such as the "Summer of Opportunity" program that provides at-risk youth with job training and leadership skills that could be transferred to workplace, school, or home settings. More often, however, the police supported the activities of youth social service providers from community-based organizations such as the Boston Community Centers' streetworker program and the Dorchester Youth Collaborative. YVSF officers and detectives would encourage at-risk youth to take advantage of these resources and also consider the input of youth workers in determining whether certain gang-involved youth would be better served by prevention and intervention actions rather than enforcement actions.

When the Boston Gun Project was initiated, the YVSF had already developed a network of working relationships that could be powerfully channeled by a more focused initiative like Operation Ceasefire. Criminal justice agency partnerships provided a varied menu of enforcement options that could be tailored to particular gangs. Without these partnerships, the available "levers" that could be pulled by the working group would have been limited. Social service and opportunity provision agencies were also integrated into Ceasefire interventions to provide a much-needed "carrot" to balance the law enforcement "stick." The inclusion of prevention and intervention programs in the Ceasefire intervention was vitally important in securing community support and involvement in the program. We believe that the legitimacy conferred upon the Ceasefire

initiative by key community members was an equally important condition that facilitated the successful implementation of this innovative program.

The Larger Boston Story II: Accountability and Police-Community Relations

There was a radical change in the relationship between the Boston Police and Boston's minority communities that pre-dated Ceasefire and had a profound influence on the trajectory of the Ceasefire intervention. This collaborative relationship, led by Ten Point Coalition activist black ministers, developed in the context of a high level of community dissatisfaction with policing strategies and tactics engaged by the Boston Police (Winship and Berrien, 1999). When the violence epidemic started in the late 1980s, the Boston Police was ill equipped to deal with the sudden increase in serious youth violence. The Boston Police relied upon highly aggressive and reportedly indiscriminate policing tactics to deal with street gang violence (Winship and Berrien, 1999; Berrien and Winship, 2002, 2003). A series of well-publicized scandals emanating from an indiscriminate policy of stopping and frisking of all black males in high-crime areas outraged Boston's black community. Perhaps the most important was the 1989 murder of Carol Stuart, a pregnant white woman on her way home from Boston City Hospital. Initially, Charles Stuart, the victim's husband who was the actual murderer, led Boston Police investigators to believe that the murderer was a black male. The police responded by blanketing the Mission Hill housing projects for a suspect. Abusive police conduct was reported to be widespread as coerced statements led to the wrongful arrest of a black male. The black community and the local media were outraged and condemned the discriminatory actions of the investigating officers. The Carol Stuart case and other

scandals lead to the establishment of the St. Clair Commission, an independent committee appointed to investigate the policies and practices of the Boston Police. In 1992 it released its report, which cited extensive corruption and incompetent management and called for extensive reform including the replacement of top personnel.

In response, the Boston Police overhauled its organization, mission, and tactics during the early 1990s. The existing command staff, including the Commissioner, were replaced with new officers who were known to be innovative and hardworking; investments were made to improve the department's technology to understand crime problems; a neighborhood policing plan was implemented; and beat-level officers were trained in the methods of community and problem-oriented policing. In 1991, the Anti-Gang Violence Unit (AGVU) was created and charged with disrupting ongoing gang conflicts rather than mounting an aggressive campaign to arrest as many offenders as possible. By 1994, the AGVU evolved into the YVSF and its mandate was broadened beyond controlling outbreaks of gang violence to more general youth violence prevention. While these changes were important in creating an environment where the police could collaborate with the community, residents of Boston's poor minority neighborhoods remained wary of and dissatisfied with a police department that had a long history of abusive and unfair treatment.

In 1992, a loosely allied group of activist black clergy formed The Ten Point Coalition after a gang invasion of the Morningstar Baptist Church. During a memorial for a slain rival gang member, mourners were attacked with knives and guns (Winship and Berrien 1999; Kennedy, Braga, and Piehl 2001; Berrien and Winship, 2002, 2003). In the wake of that outrage, the Ten Point Coalition ministers decided they should

attempt to prevent the youth in their community from joining gangs, and also that they needed to send an anti-violence message to all youth, whether gang-involved or not.

Initially, the ministers assumed an adversarial role to the Boston Police and were highly critical in the public media of police efforts to prevent youth violence. However, as the ministers worked the streets, they started to form effective relationships with particular YVSF officers and develop a shared understanding of the nature of youth violence in Boston: only a small number of youth in the neighborhoods were involved in violence, many of these gang-involved youth were better served by intervention and prevention strategies, and only a small number of these gang-involved youth needed to be removed from the streets through arrest and prosecution strategies.

The Ten Point ministers also sheltered the police from broad public criticism while the police were engaged in activities the ministers deemed to be of interest to the community and its youth. In 1995, Paul McLaughlin, a local gang prosecutor who was white, was murdered on his way home from work. The initial description of the assailant ("young black male wearing a hooded sweatshirt and baggy pants") was vague enough to cause concern by many in the black community that an "open season on young black males" similar to that during the Carol Stuart investigation would occur (Grunwald and Anand, 1995). Fortunately, these initial fears were unfounded as the black ministers and the Boston Police supported each other in the handling of the media and the ensuing investigation. The black ministers publicly praised the police for showing restraint in their conduct and the police praised the ministers for their willingness to provide help and keep the community calm (Berrien and Winship, 2002, 2003).

Prior to Ceasefire, the Ten Point ministers also helped the Boston Police manage negative publicity by the local media after several potentially explosive events ranging from the beating of a black undercover officer by uniformed police officers (Chacon, 1995) to the accidental death of 75-year-old retired minister who suffered a fatal heart attack after a botched drug raid (Mallia and Mulvhill, 1994). In these cases, the ministers took two positions. First, they demanded that the police department take responsibility for its actions --- investigate incidents thoroughly and hold those involved accountable. Second, after it was clear that the Boston Police was accepting responsibility, the ministers communicated to the community that the police were in fact reacting appropriately. This, in turn, prevented these situations from becoming racially explosive and provided the police with the continued political support they needed in order to undertake policy innovations, such as Ceasefire. In more recent years, the ministers have continued to play this dual role with regards to fatal police shootings, 8 of which occurred over a 22-month period between 2000 and 2002 (Tench, 2002).

While the Ten Point ministers were not involved in the design of the Ceasefire intervention, they were influential as an informal "litmus test" of the types of enforcement actions that would and would not be tolerated by the community. The youth workers participating in the design of Ceasefire would voice their concerns about community reaction to any proposed enforcement tactics that could be viewed as overly aggressive. However, what usually ended discussions was the recognition of the political vulnerability of the Boston Police to the consequences of the Ten Point ministers potentially reporting any questionable practices to local media and, more importantly, exerting pressure on the Mayor's Office to deal with perceived inappropriate actions by

the Department. For example, while discussing plausible interventions, the working group considered the notable gun violence reduction results of the Kansas City Gun Experiment, which involved intensive enforcement of laws against illegally carrying concealed firearms via safety frisks during traffic stops, plain view, and searches incident to arrest in gun violence hot spot areas (Sherman and Rogan, 1995). After some discussion, the working group rejected the idea of engaging a hot spots policing strategy as the Boston Police did not want to adopt an enforcement program that could be viewed by the Ten Point ministers as a return to the indiscriminate "stop and frisk" policies of the past.

When Ceasefire was ready to be implemented, the commander of the YVSF presented the program to key black ministers to obtain their approval of and involvement in the initiative. The Boston Police knew that they would need the political support of the Ten Point Coalition to pursue aggressive enforcement actions against hardcore gang members central to violent conflicts. While the Ceasefire initiative was a violence prevention campaign, given the Carol Stuart case and other incidents, the community and local media could have easily misunderstood the enforcement tactics as simply another law enforcement initiative designed to arrest large numbers of young black men. The ministers recognized the value of the Ceasefire approach to violence prevention as it was carefully focused only on violent gang-involved youth and provided social services and opportunities to gang youth who desired them. After Ceasefire was implemented, Ten Point Coalition ministers became regular members of the working group. Ministers played key roles in working with the police to identify dangerous gang-involved youth, communicating the anti-violence deterrence message to all youth and, with the help of

social service providers, offering assistance to gang youth who wanted to step away from their violent lifestyles.

By including the ministers in the Ceasefire working group, the Boston Police developed a mechanism for transparency and accountability that was very desirable to Boston's minority community. Through their involvement in Ceasefire, the ministers became part of the process of determining which gang interventions would be done and when. In addition, they, along with others, gave gangs members the message that they had a choice: stop the "gang banging" and they would be helped – with school, a job, family; continue and the full weight of the law (and the community) would come down on them, with every possible lever being used to see that they were incarcerated. At a more general level, a shared understanding of the reality of youth violence and the actions that were necessary to prevent and control that violence emerged (Berrien and Winship 2002, 2003). The transparency and involvement in the enforcement process built trust and further solidified a functional working relationship between the community and the Boston Police. In turn, by engaging a process through which they were meaningfully and appropriately accountable to the community, the Boston Police created the political support, or "umbrella of legitimacy," that it needed to pursue more focused and perhaps more aggressive intervention than would have been possible otherwise (Berrien and Winship, 2002).

Implications of the Larger Boston Story for Other Jurisdictions

Operation Ceasefire became a nationally recognized model for youth violence reduction programs and many jurisdictions quickly started to experiment with the

approach (Kennedy, in this volume). Unfortunately, despite some initial promising results, many of these replications were never fully implemented or were eventually abandoned. Braga has been involved in replication efforts in a number of cities, including Baltimore, Minneapolis, and San Francisco, and these jurisdictions simply did not have an adequate network of capacity in place before adopting a Ceasefire-like approach to youth violence. Operation Ceasefire was a "relationship intensive" intervention based on trust and the ability of a diverse set of individuals to work together towards a common goal. The narrow description of Ceasefire that currently circulates in criminal justice circles is, in many ways, a recipe for frustration and eventual failure as it simplifies the trajectory of the Boston experience. And, as suggested by the cessation of the Ceasefire in Boston during the early 2000s, it can be challenging to keep these networks focused on specific problems over extended time periods.

Effective collaborations and the trust and accountability that they entail are essential in launching a meaningful response to complex youth violence problems. However, the fact that such collaborations are needed does not guarantee that they inevitably rise or, once developed, that they are sustained. There are many significant obstacles to their development and maintenance such as giving up control over scarce resources that could compromise agencies' traditional missions, aligning agencies' individual work efforts into a functional enterprise, and developing a collective leadership among a group of individuals aligned with the needs of their individual organizations. (Bardach, 1998).

A central problem in creating and managing effective capacity-building collaborations is overcoming the problem of distrust (Bardach, 1998). Distrust corrodes

the creative process that criminal justice agencies and community-based organizations are necessarily engaged in. Like most cities, distrust characterized the relationship among criminal justice agencies and between criminal justice agencies and the inner city community in Boston. Practitioners and community members in Boston were able to overcome their historical distrust and form productive working relationships. These relationships existed before Ceasefire and were the foundation upon it was built. Of course, working groups can be forced together and, sometimes, can implement short-term programs that have promising initial results. However, if the initiative is not based on a shared understanding of the problem and cemented through functional partnerships, the initiative will fall apart. These are key issues for other jurisdictions to consider in replicating Operation Ceasefire and in sustaining the collaborative effort once it has been launched.

In many community and problem-oriented policing projects, community members serve as informants that report to the police on unacceptable community conditions and the particulars of crime problems (Skogan and Hartnett, 1997; Braga, 2008). They are rarely engaged as "partners" or "co-producers" of public safety. Police officers remain the "experts" on crime who are primarily responsible for developing and managing interventions to address crime problems. Through their collaboration with Ten Point ministers, the Boston Police discovered a system whereby they were accountable to the community. This accountability to the community became a great asset to the police. By engaging the ministers in their violence prevention efforts and creating a sense of joint ownership of the youth violence problem, the Boston Police created the political support necessary for both innovation and more focused and aggressive intervention. With the

Ten Point's approval of and involvement in Operation Ceasefire, the community supported the approach as a legitimate violence prevention campaign. Police strategies can acquire true legitimacy within the inner city only if the community partner supports police tactics when they are appropriate as well as publicly criticizes activities that are not (Berrien and Winship, 2002, 2003). Given the potentially harsh law enforcement levers that can be pulled as part of a Ceasefire-like program, we feel that community involvement is critical in replicating and sustaining such intensive violence prevention initiatives. Without the political support of the community, the police cannot pursue an innovative enforcement strategy that targets truly dangerous youth at the heart of urban youth violence problems.

Implementation Challenges in Other Jurisdictions

The multifaceted and interagency structure of focused deterrence interventions presents a number of opportunities for implementation challenges and threats to treatment integrity. Evidence suggests the extent to which focused deterrence strategies are effective in controlling crime and violence is contingent on their fidelity to core prevention principles and program activities. A national assessment of U.S. DOJ-sponsored Project Safe Neighborhoods (PSN) initiatives in 82 cities, which encouraged local sites to embrace the focused deterrence approach, found greater implementation fidelity was associated with more robust crime control gains (McGarrell, Corsaro, Hipple, and Bynum, 2010). Unfortunately, implementation challenges have been found to threaten the integrity of gang and group violence reduction, DMI, and individual offender focused programs alike. Indeed, nearly one-third of the 24 evaluations included in the

Braga et al. (2018) review of focused deterrence strategies reported at least one potential threat to treatment integrity.

Beyond the implementation challenges in Baltimore, Boston, Minneapolis, and San Francisco mentioned earlier, other gang and group-based initiatives that have also experienced noteworthy program management challenges. For instance, the robustness of the Rochester Ceasefire intervention was limited by uncertain enforcement actions, poor inter-agency communication and coordination, and deficiencies in marketing the deterrence message to the targeted audience (Delaney, 2006). The Kansas City No Violence Alliance group violence reduction strategy had to overcome early problems stemming from a lack of leadership and poor communication among participating agencies before the intervention took hold (Fox, Novak, and Yaghoub, 2015).

A high-risk individual offender variation of the Boston model was applied in Chicago, Illinois, as part of the PSN initiative. Gun- and gang-involved parolees returning to two highly dangerous Chicago Police Department districts went through "offender notification forums," where they were informed of their vulnerability as felons to federal firearms laws with stiff mandatory minimum sentences; offered social services; and addressed by community members and ex-offenders. Initial program evaluation evidence suggested that PSN generated sharp violent crime decreases in the two treated police districts and reduced recidivism among treated individuals (see Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2007; Wallace, Papachristos, Meares, and Fagan, 2015). This initial success spurred the aggressive expansion of the PSN intervention to 24 percent of the city's police districts. Unfortunately, this expansion was not accompanied by increased resources and the resulting program was not well coordinated or supported in the

expansion areas. Not surprisingly, the expanded PSN effort was not associated with any discernible crime control gains in the treated areas relative to comparison areas (Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017).

Focused deterrence programs implemented to reduce crime driven by street-level drug markets are generally called "Drug Market Intervention" (DMI) strategies (Kennedy and Wong, 2009). DMI focused deterrence strategies identify street-level dealers, immediately apprehend violent drug offenders, and suspend criminal cases for non-violent dealers. DMI strategies then bring together non-violent drug dealers, their families, law enforcement and criminal justice officials, service providers, and community leaders for a meeting that makes clear the dealing has to stop, the community cares for the offenders but reject their conduct, help is available, and renewed dealing will result in the activation of the existing case. Evaluation research has shown the DMI approach to be effective in controlling crime in High Point, North Carolina (Corsaro et al., 2012; Saunders et al., 2015) and elsewhere (Corsaro et al., 2009; Corsaro and McGarrell, 2009).

As a result of the early success of the drug market intervention approach, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA) funded an effort to systematically replicate the DMI strategy in 32 sites around the United States (Saunders, Robbins, and Ober, 2017). Of the 32 sites that attempted a DMI, only seven implemented a program with enough integrity to warrant a formal evaluation.[1] However, these seven sites also experienced difficulty implementing the DMI program properly. Deficiencies ranged from a lack of support from partnering agencies and community groups to uncertain identification of key players

[1] The seven sites included: Flint, Michigan; Guntersville, Alabama; Jacksonville, Florida; Gary, Indiana; Montgomery County, Maryland; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Roanoke, Virginia.

in targeted drug markets to diminished follow-up on enforcement and social service promises after completed call-ins with drug offenders (Saunders et al., 2016). Two of the seven sites failed to make it past the planning phase of the intervention while only four sites conducted at least one call-in and completed all five phases.

The BJA-supported evaluation of these seven sites found that DMI programs with greater implementation fidelity experienced the largest reductions in crime (Saunders, Robbins, and Ober, 2017). Similarly, Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan (2018) attributed the smaller effect sizes observed for DMI programs in their systematic review and meta-analysis to compromises in the DMI treatment as delivered in the reviewed studies. We believe that the collective BJA DMI experience, as well as the other problematic applications of focused deterrence more generally, affirms the importance of developing of a network of capacity that is rooted in trust and accountability among the collaborating agencies to ensure proper implementation.

Systematic Efforts to Improve the Implementation of Focused Deterrence

As focused deterrence programs have gained increasing prominence as a key component of a balanced portfolio of interventions to prevent urban violence, there have been systematic efforts to promote the proper implementation of these strategies. Most notably, the National Network for Safe Communities (NNSC) at the John Jay College of Criminal Justice have developed a variety of practitioner-oriented resources that structure program activities to ensure treatment integrity in focused deterrence strategies. For instance, NNSC (2016) recommends that after a focused deterrence call-in is held:

> 1) The working group should meet to recap the call-in and plan future project activities.

2) Data analysis should be ongoing and performance metrics continuously tracked.

3) Follow through on promises made at call-ins must materialize (e.g., enforcement actions, connecting clients to social services, and continuing to engage with the moral voices of the community).

4) Communication with clients should be ongoing via holding additional call-ins, conducting custom notifications at the residences of clients, contacting high-risk individuals not under community supervision, and interrupting escalating violence.

In addition to maintaining and ensuring treatment integrity from the outset of implementation, local jurisdictions should focus on the developing accountability structures and sustainability plans before focused deterrence programs commence. Accountability and sustainability in focused deterrence initiatives can be threatened by personnel turnover due to its reliance on a number of key actors required across multiple agencies and groups to successfully execute the strategy. The continuity of the original Boston Ceasefire intervention was seriously hindered by personnel turnover among key criminal justice managers and important community stakeholders involved in the process (Braga, Hureau, and Winship, 2008). There are, however, ways that the consequences of personnel turnover could be minimized. For example, in response to substantial turnover of key staff involved with the Chicago PSN program, project coordinators conducted "reboot" trainings with new replacement staff to ensure buy-in and maintain treatment integrity (Grunwald and Papachristos, 2017, p. 142).

The National Network for Safe Communities (2016) outlined two ways that program sustainability and accountability could be enhanced: 1) establishing a governing structure that extends beyond the working group and 2) creating a performance maintenance system for intelligence gathering and analysis as well as continually keeping

partners engaged in the project. The most comprehensive approach to address sustainability concerns through establishing a formal multi-level governance structure was undertaken by the Cincinnati Initiative to Reduce Violence (CIRV). Prior to the initiation of the intervention, CIRV staff recruited local business executives and social science researchers to participate in the planning process and provide input that would increase long-term viability of the intervention (Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins, 2012). The three primary ways these outside experts assisted with the overall design of the CIRV via: "(a) development of an organizational structure, (b) utilization of corporate strategic planning principles for managing the work, and (c) systematic data collection to assist in decision making and outcome evaluation" (Tillyer, Engel, and Lovins, 2012, p. 978).

Three tiers made up the CIRV organizational structure (Engel, Tillyer, and Corsaro, 2013). At the top was a *Governing Board* composed of high ranking city officials who were responsible for overseeing the project, providing resources, and overcoming obstacles encountered during implementation. Reporting to the Governing Board was a *Strategy and Implementation Team* comprised of spokespersons, heads of individual strategy team, consultants, and an executive director and this body was responsible for daily operations, strategy development, and monitoring results. There were four *Individual Strategy Teams* that were responsible for carrying out particular aspects of the intervention and these included a law enforcement team, social services team, community engagement team, and systems team. In this tiered organizational structure, the governing board offers a stabilizing presence when there is personnel turnover among team leaders, consultants, and members of individual strategy teams.

The second area where outside experts contributed to the CIRV was incorporating corporate principles into project planning and implementation. Utilizing corporate principles was intended to help project participants organize, prioritize, and assign tasks needing accomplished (Tillyer et al., 2012). These assignments, along with corresponding performance measures, were tracked using "balanced scorecards" in order to promote accountability among teams for short-term performance assessments while also linking metrics to the overall strategy (Tillyer et al., 2012, p. 980). Tillyer and colleagues (2012) noted that there was initial resistance to this form of oversight among participating law enforcement and social service providers but its value was demonstrated when some team members began experiencing "mission creep" and the tool helped as a corrective influence realigning them with the intervention's goals and objectives.

Systematic data collection was the final area where outside experts assisted with the CIRV. The purpose of establishing systematic data collection is to provide project managers and decision makers with the most thorough and accurate depiction of the problem possible. In addition to impact measures (e.g., the number of homicides or group-involved shootings), data collection efforts for the CIRV also incorporated several process measures in order to assess treatment fidelity (Tillyer et al., 2012). Process measures that were examined included "the extent to which the message was delivered to the target population, the level of law enforcement action that was being taken against violent groups linked to a homicide, and details regarding the delivery of services to those who were requesting help" (Tillyer et al., 2012, pp. 981-982).

One particular data collection tool that has proven valuable in gang and group-based focused deterrence interventions is the shooting scorecard. A shooting scorecard

tracks the number of shootings committed by groups in a given area over a defined period of time (e.g., weeks, months, or years). Convening appropriate individuals (e.g., detectives, patrol officers, crime analysts, etc.) to collectively review shooting scorecards at regular meetings offers a number of benefits: it presents timely information on gun violence to project personnel, it provides police with a better understanding of the dynamics of gun violence in their jurisdiction, and it assists management with identifying the most frequently offending and high risk groups and ensuring that resources are distributed accordingly (Braga and Hureau, 2012; Braga, Hureau, and Grossman, 2014). Shooting scorecards have been found to be an effective tool in cities seeking implement and track group violence interventions, such as Boston, Massachusetts; Newark, New Jersey; Oakland, California; and Salinas, California (see Braga and Hureau, 2012; Braga et al., 2014; Conroy, Harmon, and Roehl, 2015).

Conclusion

Existing program evaluation evidence suggests that focused deterrence strategies generate significant crime reduction impacts when applied to gang and group-related violence, disorderly street drug markets, and repeat offender problems (Braga, Weisburd, and Turchan, 2018; Weisburd and Majmundar, 2017). Some observers suggest focused deterrence strategies hold great promise in improving strained relationships between minority neighborhoods and the police departments that serve them through the inclusion of community members in the strategy, engagement of offenders in procedurally-just offender notification sessions, and the provision of service and opportunities to offenders (Brunson, 2015; Meares, 2009). However, focused deterrence programs need to be

implemented properly to generate these desirable crime control gains and police-community relations benefits. The available program evaluation evidence reviewed here suggests that it is difficult for local jurisdictions to achieve successful program implementations that remain robust over time.

A careful analysis of the implementation of focused deterrence in Boston suggests that jurisdictions need to ensure that a vibrant network of capacity that is grounded in trust and accountability needs to be in place when these programs commence. Experiences in other jurisdictions affirm the larger Boston story and offer a broader knowledge base to consider the development of accountability structures and sustainability plans to make certain that programs remain potent and appropriately focused beyond the initial implementation. Without such a priori planning and structure development, focused deterrence programs will not achieve their desired crime control reduction goals. And, equally concerning, the inappropriate implementation of these programs could exacerbate poor police-community relations and generate collateral harms through the increased surveillance and harsh enforcement if these strategies are not appropriately focused (Griffiths and Christian, 2015). Focused deterrence strategies have been described elsewhere as exercises in "getting deterrence right" (e.g., Braga, 2012); we think it is critically important for jurisdictions experimenting with these strategies need to be equally committed to the exercise of "getting implementation right."

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Figure 1.


Youth Homicides in Boston, 1976 - 2016
Victims Ages 24 and Under
Ceasefire I, 1996 - 2000
Ceasefire II, May, 2007
Number of Victims
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